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AUTHOR: 


SWEDENBORG, 
EMANUEL 


TITLE: 


ONTOLOGY:  FROM  A 
PHOTOLITHOGRAPHIC 


PLACE: 


PHILADELPHIA 


DA  TE : 


1880 


Master  Negative  # 


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COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

BIISLIOGRAPHIC  MICROJFQRM  TARGET 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


938 ,94 
Sw343 


Oitolo'^ia.  Enp;,  Cabell, 

Swedenborg,  Emanuel,  1688-1772,   • 

Ontology,  by  Einanuel  Swedenborg,  From  a  photo- 
lithographic copy  of  the  original  Latin  manu* 
script  still  preserved  in  the  library  of  the     , 
Academy  of  aciences  at  Stockholm.   Tranalated  by  ^ 
Philip  B,  Cabell  ...  Philadelphia,  Printed  by 
Jo  S,  Lippinoott  k   oo, ,  1880. 

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ONTOLOGY. 


BY 


EMANUEL  SWEDENBOKG. 


FROM  A  PHOTOLITHOGRAPHIC  COPY  OF  THE  ORIGINAL  LATIN 

MANUSCRIPT  STILL  PRESERVED  IN  THE  LIBRARY  OF 

THE  ACADEMY  OF  SCIENCES  AT  STOCKHOLM. 


TRANSLATED    BV 

PHILIP   B.  CABELL,  A.M., 

PROFESSOR   OF   ANCIENT   LANGUAGES    IN    URBANA   UNIVERSITY. 


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„       .  .     P,RINTED  BY     * 
J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  &  CO.,  THILADELPHIA. 

1880. 


^' 


.*f . 


§4 


\ 


ADYEETISEMENT. 


Mrs.  E  by 


Copyright,  1880,  by  Philip  B.  Cabkll,  A.M. 


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In  Hs  preface  to  tte  Latin  edition  of  Swedenborg's  « De 
Anima"  Dr.  Emanuel  Tafel  mentions  a  short  tract  entitled  "  De 
Oniologia,"  which  was  bound  in  the  same  MS.  volume  with  the 
larger  treatise.     The  publication  of  this  tract,  Dr.  Tafel  says, 
was  omitted  at  the  time  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  the  Swe- 
denborg  Society,  yet  he  deemed  it  of  such  importance  that  he 
gave  its  table  of  contents  in  the  preface  before  mentioned. 
This  special  notice  in  so  distinguished  a  quarter,  and  the  ready 
access  given  to  Swedenborg's  posthumous  MSS.  by  the  Photo- 
lithographic copies  of  them,  so  ably  edited  by  Dr.  R.  L.  Tatel, 
led  to  the  transcription  and  translation  of  the  tract.    The  gen- 
erosity of  a  Boston  gentleman,*  who  had  seen  a  notice  of  its 
contents,  supplied  the  means  for  its  publication. 

It  is  believed  that  the  treatise  will  be  useful  in  more  clearly 
defining  certain  philosophical  terms  in  frequent  use  through- 
out Swedenborg's  scientific  writings.  Although  it  was  probably 
written  at  some  period  prior  to  the  author's  illumination,  it 
seems  quite  reasonable  to  infer  that  the  meaning  of  those  terms 
remained  essentially  the  same  in  his  Theological  works. 

The  translator  is  quite  aware  of  imperfections  in  his  perform- 
ance. His  task,  though  brief,  was  not  an  easy  one.  The  hand- 
writing of  the  original  is  in  parts  so  obscure  that  there  are  still  a 
few  passages  in  which  the  text  has  not  been  determined  beyond 


*  Kev.  Wm.  R.  Alger. 


8 


^) 


«J^;>;'L, 


^  ADVERTISEMENT, 

doubt.  Moreover,  in  subjects  so  purely  abstract,  perfect  accu- 
racy and  perspicuity  are  difficult  of  attainment.  K  these  have 
been  at  all  approached,  it  is  largely  owing  to  the  able  assist- 
ance of  friends  who  have  kindly  reviewed  both  the  Latin  tran- 
scription and  the  subsequent  version.  Without  desiring  to 
render  them  responsible  for  his  own  short-comings,  the  trans- 
lator acknowledges  his  obligations  to  Dr.  S.  H.  Worcester, 
of  Bridgewater,  Mass.,  and  Prest.  F.  Sewall,  of  Urbana  Uni- 
versity. 

Urbana,  Ohio,  Nov.  6th,  1880. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  •  PAGE 

I. — Form— Formal  Cause "^ 

11. — Figure l^.- 

ni. — Organ — Structure l'^ 

IV. — State — Changes  op  State 15 

V. — Substance 1*^ 

VI.— Matter— Material 20 

VII. Extent — Extension— Continuous — Contiguous— Part  24 

VIII.— Body— Things  Corporeal 27 

IX. — Essence — Essentials 29 

X. — Attribute ^^ 

XI. — Predicate ^^ 

XII.— Subject     .       • ^'^ 

XIII. — Affection ^'^ 

XIV.— Accidents         .        .        .        • ^^ 

XV. — Contingents ^^ 

XVI. — Modes— Modification ^^ 


ONTOLOGY.* 


?4 


L»y 


CHAPTEE   I. 

^  FOKM— FOKMAL  CAUSE. 

Form  is  divided  into  external  and  internal  External  or 
extrinsic  form  is  that  which  is  outside  of  the  essence  of  a  sub- 
stance. Thus  indeed  every  accidental  form  might  be  called 
an  external  form;  but  by  extrinsic  form  we  understand  an 
exemplary  cause  or  idea,  according  to  the  hkeness  of  which 
an  effect  is  produced.  Intririsie  form  is  that  which  consti- 
tutes the  thing  formed  either  substantial  or  accidental.  Ac- 
cidental form  is  that  which  exists  in  a  substance,  whether 
that  substance  be  spiritual  or  material,  and  which,  together 
with  that  substance,  in  which  it  exists,  constitutes  an  acci- 
dental compound.  Intrinsic  substantial  form  is  either  form- 
ing or  assisting.  When  forming,  it  is  either  regarded  as  one 
part  of  a  physical  compound,  and  is  then  called  the  form 
of  that  part,  or  it  is  regarded  as  the  whole  of  whatever 
belongs  to  any  given  substance,  and  is  then  called  the  form 
of  the  whole.  Thus  the  whole  essence  of  the  natural  body 
is  called  its  form  in  this  sense.  Of  form  separable  from 
matter  there  exists  only  one  example,  namely,  the  rational 
soul.  Inseparable  form  is  that  which  is  so  bound  to  matter 
that  it  cannot  exist  or  operate  outside  of  matter.  This  also 
makes  generic  and  specific  forms.  Assisting  form  is  that 
which  does  not  actuate  or  form  its  own  matter,  but  only 
assists  it,  bestowing  upon  it  motion  and  operation.  Form,  in 
a  wider  acceptation  of  the  term,  is  divided  into  metaphysical 

*  See  vol.  vi.,  pp.  323-342,  PhotoUth,  7 


g  ONTOLOGY, 

and  physical.  Metaphysical  form,  in  the  sense  of  essence, 
is  the  whole  essence  of  a  substantial  thing,  or,  according  to 
others,  its  entire  nature.  No  form  constitutes  s,  compound, 
•except  in  conjunction  with  matter  of  some  kind.  Some 
have  asserted  that  form  pre-exists  in  matter  before  the  gen- 
eration of  a  thing.  Others  have  said  that  forms  are  actually 
in  matter  before  things  are  generated;  nevertheless,  that 
they  do  not  appear,  but,  during  the  confusion  of  the  forces 
resident  in  matter,  they,  as  it  were,  lie  hid,  and  become 
manifest  by  means  of  generation :  as  for  instance,  the  plant, 
in  the  matter  of  a  seed.  Others  have  asserted  that^  before 
generation,  form  has  actual  esse  in  matter,  imperfect  indeed, 
and  as  it  were,  inchoate ;  but  that,  by  means  ^  of  gene- 
ration, form  begins  to  be  in  matter  according  to  its  perfect 
esse.  Still  others  have  said  that  all  substantial  forms  are 
made  anew  by  the  act  of  creation.  The  Peripatetic  philoso- 
phers taught  that  certain  substantial  forms  are  spiritual  and 
independent  of  matter,  though  truly  forming  it ;  but  that 
there  are  other  material  forms  so  inherent  in  matter,  that 
they  depend  upon  it  for  their  creation  and  being.  Of  the 
former   kind   are    human    souls    alone.      Robert   Baron, 

Metaphysics. 

Form  is  substance  incomplete  and  imperfect,  or  half-sub- 
stance, but  joined  to  matter  it  becomes  substance  entire. 
Form  is  described  as  a  second  principle,  second  part,  or 
second  ingredient  of  natural  things.  These  regard  not  the 
potency  of  form,  but  its  actuality,  which  latter  it  derives  from 
matter.  Aristotle  says  that  form  desires  matter  as  the  female 
does  the  male.  Form  is  that  which  not  only  gives  esse  to 
things,  but  which  also  makes  them  diverse,  and  distinguishes 
one  from  another.  Dupleix. 

Essential  determinations  are  what  is  commonly  called  form, 
likewise  also  formal  cause.  He  understands  the  form  of  the 
human  body,  who  understands,  not  only  its  structure,  conse- 
quently the  figures  of  its  organic  parts,  and  the  manner  in  which 
they  are  joined  together,  but  also  the  combination  of  similar 
parts,  whence  the  organic  parts  are  composed.  Similarly,  he 
understands  the  form  of  a  stone,  who  knows  by  what  combi- 
nation the  particles  are  produced  and  in  what  manner  they 
are  joined  together  in  order  that  the  mass  of  the  stone  may 


FORM— FORMAL  CAUSE.  Q 

result.  An  ens  derives  from  its  form  the  fact  that  it  is  of 
a  given  genus  or  species,  and  that  it  is  distinguished  from 
others.  From  form  also  an  ens  derives  the  power  of  acting 
in  a  given  manner.  Form  must  be  regarded  as  among  the 
causes  of  things,  for  by  means  of  its  form  we  understand 
why  an  ens  is  such  as  it  is,  rather  than  something  else,  and 
why  it  is  suited  to  act  in  a  given  manner.  Consequently, 
the  reason  of  these  things  is  contained  in  the  form.  It  is 
therefore  the  principle  upon  which  the  ois  depends,  that  it 
may  exist  such  as  it  is ;  consequently  it  is  a  cause  of  the  ens. 
In  this  respect  essential  determinations  are  called  form. 
Form  is,  therefore,  the  principle  of  the  actuality  of  the  ens, 
upon  which  doubtless  depends  the  existence  of  the  ens  as 
such ;  so  that  form  and  essence  are  thus  distinguished  from 
each  other,  although  each  of  these  is  constituted  by  essential 
determinations;  in  a  different  respect  however  from  that 
which  they  have  to  the  ens  itself.  AVolf. 

Form  is  the  entire  construction  of  a  body,  embracing  the 
composition,  co-ordination,  subordination,  and  determination 
of  its  parts,  whether  these  be  integral  parts  or  the  individual 
parts  of  a  compound,  whence  that  compound  derives  not  only 
its  essence  but  the  quality  of  its  essence.  For  from  the  form 
is  derived  the  fact  that  the  ois  is  such  as  it  is  found  to 
be ;  so  that  from  a  knowledge  of  the  form,  there  follows  also 
a  knowledge  of  the  quality  and  essence  of  any  given  body, 
besides  also  of  its  dependence  and  relation  to  others.  For 
such  knowledge  involves  that  of  its  connexions,  position, 
its  order,  its  fluxion,  and  many  other  things,  which  cause  the 
body  to  be  such  as  it  is,  rather  than  something  else.  In 
compounds  and  in  bodies  there  are  matters,  or  things  which 
flow  from  matters,  and  which  determine  the  form.  For 
form,  without  matter,  in  corporeal  things,  is  a  mere  imag- 
inary entity  or  an  idea  which  does  not  really  exist.  Hence, 
by  some  all  that  is  called  matter  by  which  form  is  deter- 
mined :  so  that  where  form  is,  there  is  matter ;  for,  that  a 


**t»w»M"  i*«^'i»,-!fi1*"(H!>*'  "-'■, , 


'.,»-.  ''^i./iK-ji/m^^tlemf<trm--'«»' 


J 


10 


ONTOLOGY. 


FORM— FORMAL  CAUSE. 


11 


thing  be  a  form  at  all,  this  it  derives  from  matter.  The  re- 
sult is  that  three  principles  are  established,  namely,  matter, 
form,  and  the  privation  of  form.  All  that  is  matter  from 
which  is  form,  but  the  word  material  has  a  different  sense  so 
far  as  it  is  opposed  to  spiritual. 

Spiritual  form,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  be  called  a  con- 
struction, composition,  or  determination  of  parts,  for  all  these 
are  terms  which  apply  to  forms  purely  material  and  corporeal. 
Yet  in  spiritual  forms  there  must  be  understood  a  certain 
determination,  yea  also  an  ordination  of  entities  and  of  forces 
flowing  thence,  which  bear  an  analogy  and  a  certain  corre- 
spondence to  those  which  exist  in  bodies.  For  spiritual  forms 
and  their  operations  exceed  all  ideas  which  are  material,  or 
which  are  joined  to  material  things,  yea  even  the  very  words 
by  which  those  ideas  are  expressed.  For  there  exist  higher 
analogies  which  are  too  unlimited  and  too  undefined  to  be 
expressed  by  them.  Moreover  spiritual  forms  have  this  in 
common  with  others,  that  spirits  derive  from  their  form  the 
fact  that  they  are  such  as  they  are  understood  to  be ;  and  this 
is  the  reason  why  there  is  given  such  a  variety  of  spirit,  or 
of  spiritual  forms. 

In  the  mean  time  Simple  forms,  or  forms  simply  consid- 
ered, are  superior  and  inferior ;  of  which  some,  or  all,  may 
occur  in  a  compound  form ;  as,  in  the  animal  body,  in  which 
forms  simply  considered  are  all  contained ;  and  because  we 
cannot  understand  of  what  quality  corporeal  form  can  be, 
without  the  understanding  of  simple  forms,  therefore  these 
latter  must  be  explained. 

External  form  is  taken  in  two  senses:  first  as  inferior  form; 
for  inferior  form  is  always  exterior,  and  superior  is  always 
interior.  Thus  the  rational  mind  is  an  internal  form,  while 
the  body  is  an  external  form ;  or,  cause  is  internal  form  and 
effect  is  external  form :  since,  indeed,  effect  reveals,  as  in  an 
image,  its  own  cause.    Under  external  form  also  are  included 


1) 


the   outward  construction  and  determination  of  the  body, 
whence  are  derived  its  comeliness  or  deformity,  its  beauty 
and  loveliness.     This  external- form  is  equally  the  image  of 
the  internal  form,  for  in  like  manner  as  form  has  its  deter- 
minations, so  also  it  should  have  its  terminations,  which  truly 
correspond  with  its  internal  determination.     For  example, 
every  circular  form  must  consist  of  perpetual  circles  as  its 
parts ;    and   the   common   circle  itself,  by  its  own  determi- 
nation indicates  what  its  internal  form  is.      Thus  internal 
and  external  forms  will  correspond.     Otherwise  an  angular 
form  might  externally  assume  the  circular  form,  or  even 
the  spiral,  not  however  of  itself  or  of  its  own  nature,  but 
from  art.     From  its  very  hardness,  coldness,  or  resistance, 
it  appears  that  the  form  itself  is  angular.    It  must  therefore  be 
seen  whether  the  internal  form  produces  naturally  the  external, 
thus  whether  they  correspond,  or  whether  some  more  perfect 
form  have  been  superinduced  upon  it :  as,  for  instance,  the 
human  form  impressed  or  engraved  upon  wax,  marble,  or 
brass.     That  a  form  may  be  truly  human,  in  every  smallest 
part  there  must  be  something  human,  or  inspired  with  a  human 

soul. 

Everything  must  have  its  own  form,  that  there  may  be  some- 
thing from  whence  is  derived  its  actuality  or  essence,  its  quid' 
dity  (a  word  I  would  like),  its  quality,  causality,  and  its  very 
faculty  of  acting  and  being  acted  upon.  Thus  a  thing  without 
form  is  an  atom  of  no  principle,  that  is  nothing.  Each  thing, 
mode,  sense,  or  force  has  its  own  form.  Every  body,  viscus, 
or  part,  whether  solid  or  fluid,  as  the  blood,  the  animal  spirit, 
yea  the  soul  itself,  has  its  form.  Every  society,  least  and 
greatest,  has  its  own  form  of  government,  its  dependence 
and  relation  to  others,  its  order,  laws,  and  other  things, 
which  are  determined  along  with  its  form. 


12 


ONTOLOGY, 


CHAPTER    11. 


FIGURE. 

In  a  compound,  which  is  not  continuous,  all  the  parts  have 
a  determined  position  with  regard  to  each  other.  The  boun- 
dary of  an  extent  is  called  figure.  A  finite  compound  ens  is 
endowed  with  a  certain  figure.  A  compound  ens  in  imagi- 
nary space,  in  which  it  is  supposed  to  exist,  designates  a  figure 
agreeing  with  its  own ;  a  plane  figure  if  its  own  be  plane ;  a 
liollow  figure  if  its  own  be  convex ;  and  a  convex  figure  if 
its  own  be  concave.  If  to  a  compound  ens  certain  parts  be 
added,  or  if  from  the  same  any  be  taken  away  or  transposed, 
and  in  the  boundary  of  its  extent  anything  occurs  which  was 
different  before,  the  figure  of  those  parts  is  changed.  But  if 
nothing  then  occurs  which  was  not  in  the  same  manner  com- 
prehended under  their  former  boundary,  their  figure  is  not 
changed.  Figure  is  an  accident ;  for  figure  is  not  a  modi- 
fiable ens.  For  since  figure  is  the  boundary  of  an  extent, 
we  cannot  conceive  any  other  change  in  it,  than  that  it  be 
taken  away,  or  that  another  be  substituted  in  its  place.  In- 
deed we  can  by  no  means  conceive  that  it  possesses  intrinsic 
determinations,  of  which  some  are  changed  into  others,  while 
still  others  remain  the  same,  nor  consequently  that  it  is  like  a 
subject  which  is  capable  of  diverse  determinations,  since  such 
a  subject  is  the  extent  which  is  limited ;  but  the  boundary  of 
the  same  is  not  so.     Therefore  figure  is  an  accident. 

Wolf's  Ontology. 

Figure  appears  as  though  it  might  signify  external  form, 
but  there  is  a  difference  between  them.  External  form  refers 
itself  to  its  internal  as  to  something  continuous  with  it ;  as, 
for  example,  the  expression  of  the  face,  of  the  actions  and  of 
the  speech,  to  the  mind.  In  so  fiir  as  the  face  itself  is  re- 
garded as  the  external  form  of  the  human  head,  and  refei^ 
itself  to  the  internal  form  of  the  same,  it  must  not  be  called 
a  figure ;  but  in  so  far  as  it  is  taken  separately  from  that 


FIGURE. 


13 


4 


form,  and  indeed  is  regarded  as  a  surface,  which  belongs  to 
planometry,  it  is  called  a  figure ;  wherefore  there  is  given  a 
figure  of  the  face,  a  figure  of  the  mouth,  of  the  nose,  of  the 
eye ;  but  the  form  involves  all  these  at  once.    In  Geometries, 
figure  differs  from  form  as  a  plane  from  a  cube,  and  the  pecu- 
liar nature  of  figure  is  like  that  of  a  geometric  figure  con- 
sidered as  regards  its  integral  construction  and  its  nature 
resulting  thence,  being  that  of  a  compound.     Thus  form  is 
withdrawn  from  figure,  the  more  it  is  raised  to  the  higher 
powers,  as,  for  instance,  to  the  cube  of  a  square,  and  the  cube 
of  a  cube,  and  so  on :  for  these  are  far  removed  from  the 
measure   of  plane   surfaces.      So    also    there   are   superior 
forms,  which  cannot  be  called  figured  forms,  because  they 
are   not   bounded   by   space  within    themselves,   but    only 
by  imaginary  space  without  themselves:  for  in  order  that 
they  may  include  space  in  themselves,  there  must  be  refer- 
ence to  some  centre,  superficies  or  diameter;    and  further, 
when  these  perish,  as  they  do  when  such   determinations 
exist,  then  perishes  also  the  idea  of  space ;  because  in  form 
itself,  there  is  no  idea  of  space,  but  the  latter  can  be  con- 
ceived of  as  outside  of  it.    Such  form  also  is  free  from  figure, 
because  it  is  free  from  space  and  extent ;  moreover  it  is  with- 
out every  limitation.     Thus  superior  forms  gradually  recede 
from  the  idea  of  space  and  figure,  as  they  are  more  highly 
elevated.     Therefore,  as  determinations  regarded  as  within  a 
space  constitute  form,  so  terminations  regarded  as  it  ivere 
without  that  space,  constitute  figure.     On  the  other  hand,  in 
a  form  of  which  there  are  given  no  terminations,  except  such 
forms  as  may  be  regarded  as  continuous,  the  figure  itself 
must  be  ideally  conceived  as  without  that  form,  and  not,  as 
though  it  were  adjoined  to  it.    For  a  form  which  occupies  no 
space  regarded  as  such  in  itself,  cannot  be  said  to  be  termi- 
nated, but  its  terminus,  or  its  every  termination,  must  be 
conceived  as  occupying  space  outside  of  that  form. 


14 


ONTOLOGY. 


CHAPTER    IIL 


ORGAN— STRUCTURE. 


An  organic  body,  by  virtue  of  ite  composition,  is  suited  to 
its  own  peculiar  action.  A  simple  organic  body  is  one  which 
is  composed  of  no  other  organic  parts.  The  reverse  is  true 
of  a  compound  organic  body.  The  essence  of  an  organic 
body  consists  in  its  structure.  The  reason  of  those  things 
which  enter  into  an  organic  body,  in  so  far  as  it  is  or- 
ganic, whether  they  are  actually  in  it,  or  may  be  m  it,  is 
contained  in  its  structure.  In  that  same  structure  ought  to 
be  contained  a  sufficient  reason  why  the  organic  body  is 
suited  to  an  action  of  that  peculiar  kind.  If  the  parts  of  an 
organic  body  consist  of  mixed  matter,  and  the  mixture  of 
it  be  in  any  manner  dissolved,  the  organic  body  perishes. 
•^  H  Wolf. 

Structure  is  the  same  as  form,  but  only  in  compounds, 
which  are  physically  and  mechanically  considered,  and  to 
which  are  attributed  parts,  space,  extent,  mass,  magnitude, 
matter,  weight,  motion,  figure,  and  the  like;  but  form  is 
something  more  universal  and  is  given  also  in  more  simple 
things,  yea  in  the  most  simple,  with  the  proviso,  nevertheless 
that'structure  corresponds  with  it.  For  such  things,  as  those 
above  mentioned,  must  be  conceived  as  residing  in  each  and 
every  form,  although  they  be  not  actually  in  it,  but  in  their 
stead  certain  analogous  and  more  interior  qualities,  which 
cannot  be  so   named  or  to  which  sucli  predicates  do   not 

apply-  ^  .    .  1 

An  organ  is  an  instrument  and  supposes  some  principle  or 
principal  cause  by  which  it  is  brought  into  action ;  so  that  it 
does  not  possess  in  itself  a  principle  of  action,  unless  so  far  as  it 
derives  it  from  another  cause  holding  the  chief  place.  The 
human  body  is  purely  organic,  the  soul  being  its  active  princi- 


STATE— CHANGES   OF  STATE. 


15 


^ 


pie.  In  like  manner  the  body  consists  of  an  unbroken  series 
of  organs  or  instruments  of  the  active  soul.  The  term  organic 
is  properly  predicated  of  the  parts  of  the  animal  kingdom. 
The  term  instrument  belongs  to  things  without  life. 


CHAPTER   IV. 


STATE— CHANGES  OF  STATE. 


From  the  determination  of  the  changeable  properties  of  a 
thing  arises  its  state,  so  that  state  is  the  co-existence  of 
changeable  properties,  with  the  same  in  a  fixed  condition. 
If  state  consist  of  intrinsic  changeable  properties,  namely,  of 
modes,  it  is  called  internal ;  if  of  extrinsic  properties,  such  as 
are  the  relations  of  the  thing  to  other  things,  it  is  called  ex- 
ternal state.  If  the  same  changeable  properties  exist  in  two 
things,  A  and  B,  their  states  are  the  same :  if  diverse,  their 
states  are  diverse.  If  the  changeable  properties,  which  are 
predicated  of  a  thing,  do  not  remain  the  same,  its  state  is 
changed.  The  internal  state  of  a  thing  is  changed  if  its 
modes  do  not  remain  the  same;  but  its  external  state  is 
changed  if  its  relations  to  other  things  do  not  remain  the 
same.  A  finite  ens  may  have  now  some  states  and  then 
others,  but  it  cannot  have  all  at  the  same  time.        Wolf. 

State  is  the  co-existence  of  determinations  in  any  given 
form  ;  as,  in  the  circle,  the  co-existence  of  the  determination 
of  the  diameters  from  the  circumference  towards  the  centre. 
The  state  of  the  circle  is  not  changed  so  long  as  the  circle 
remains  a  circle.  When  the  circle  is  expanded  and  contracted, 
then  its  state  is  not  changed,  but  its  forces  tire  varied  and 
modified,  or,  in  other  words,  there  is  a  variation  and  modifica- 
tion of  its  forces,  from  which  variation  and  modification  new 
forms  and  new  states  are  wont  to  be  formed,  the  essence  of  the 


V 


s  .  - 


14 


ONTOLOGY. 


STATE— CHANGES   OF  STATE. 


15 


CHAPTER    III. 


ORGAN— STRUCTURE. 


An  organic  body,  by  virtue  of  its  composition,  is  suited  to 
its  own  peculiar  action.  A  simple  organic  body  is  one  which 
is  composed  of  no  other  organic  parts.  The  reverse  is  true 
of  a  compound  organic  body.  The  essence  of  an  organic 
body  consists  in  its  structure.  The  reason  of  those  things 
whicli  enter  into  an  organic  body,  in  so  far  as  it  is  or- 
ganic, whether  they  are  actually  in  it,  or  may  be  in  it,  is 
contained  in  its  structure.  In  that  same  structure  ought  to 
be  contained  a  sufficient  reason  why  the  organic  body  is 
suited  to  an  action  of  that  peculiar  kind.  If  the  parts  of  an 
organic  body  consist  of  mixed  matter,  and  the  mixture  ot 
it  be  in  any  manner  dissolved,  the  organic  body  perishes. 
-^  Wolf. 

Structure  is  the  same  as  form,  but  only  in  compounds, 
which  are  physically  and  mechanically  considered,  and  to 
which  are  attributed  parts,  space,  extent,  mass,  magnitude, 
matter,  weight,  motion,  figure,  and  the  like;  but  form  is 
something  more  universal  and  is  given  also  in  more  simple 
things,  yea  in  the  most  simple,  with  the  proviso,  nevertheless 
that'structure  corresponds  with  it.  For  such  things,  as  those 
above  mentioned,  must  be  conceived  as  residing  in  each  and 
every  form,  although  they  be  not  actually  in  it,  but  in  their 
stead  certain  analogous  and  more  interior  qualities,  which 
cannot  be  so   named  or  to  which  such  predicates  do   not 

apply-  ,  .    .  1 

An  organ  is  an  instrument  and  supposes  some  principle  or 
principaf  cause  by  which  it  is  brought  into  action ;  so  that  it 
does  not  possess  in  itself  a  principle  of  action,  unless  so  fer  as  it 
derives  it  from  another  cause  holding  the  chief  place.  The 
human  body  is  purely  organic,  the  soul  being  its  active  princi- 


^ 


& 


pie.  In  like  manner  the  body  consists  of  an  unbroken  series 
of  organs  or  instruments  of  the  active  soul.  The  term  organic 
is  properly  predicated  of  the  parts  of  the  animal  kingdom. 
The  term  instrument  belongs  to  things  without  life. 


CHAPTEE   IV. 

STATE— CHANGES  OF  STATE. 

From  the  determination  of  the  changeable  properties  of  a 
thing  arises  its  state,  so  that  state  is  the  co-existence  of 
changeable  properties,  with  the  same  in  a  fixed  condition. 
If  state  consist  of  intrinsic  changeable  properties,  namely,  of 
modes,  it  is  called  internal ;  if  of  extrinsic  properties,  such  as 
are  the  relations  of  the  thing  to  other  things,  it  is  called  ex- 
ternal state.  If  the  same  changeable  properties  exist  in  two 
things,  A  and  B,  their  states  are  the  same :  if  diverse,  their 
states  are  diverse.  If  the  changeable  properties,  which  are 
predicated  of  a  thing,  do  not  remain  the  same,  its  state  is 
changed.  The  internal  state  of  a  thing  is  changed  if  its 
modes  do  not  remain  the  same;  but  its  external  state  is 
changed  if  its  relations  to  other  things  do  not  remain  the 
same.  A  finite  eiis  may  have  now  some  states  and  then 
others,  but  it  cannot  have  all  at  the  same  time.         Wolf. 

State  is  the  co- existence  of  deteiminations  in  any  given 
form  ;  as,  in  the  circle,  the  co-existence  of  the  determination 
of  the  diameters  from  the  circumference  towards  the  centre. 
The  state  of  the  circle  is  not  changed  so  long  as  the  circle 
remains  a  circle.  When  the  circle  is  expanded  and  contracted, 
then  its  state  is  not  changed,  but  its  forces  are  varied  and 
modified,  or,  in  other  words,  there  is  a  variation  and  modifica- 
tio7i  of  its  forces,  from  which  variation  and  modification  new 
forms  and  new  states  are  wont  to  be  formed,  the  essence  of  the 


16 


ONTOLOGY. 


SUBSTANCE. 


17 


circle  remaining  the  same.  From  sucli  variation  in  the  ani- 
mal body  vital  actions  are  produced ;  and  in  the  atmospheric 
world,  modifications,  which,  in  the  sensory  organs,  become 

sensations. 

Changes  of  state  are  changes  of  determinations  in  any 
given  form  in  respect  to  their  co-existence ;  as,  in  circular 
forms,  in  respect  to  the  co-existence  of  their  determinations, 
that  is,  of  the  radii  towards  the  centre ;  thus,  when  the  de- 
termination of  the  centre  is  changed,  the  state  of  the  circle 
is  changed,  as  when  it  is  transf!)rmed  into  an  ellipse,  a 
cycloid,  a  conoid,  a  parabola,  and  other  figures.  So  also  it 
is  with  all  other  forms,  except  in  angular  forms,  where  there 
is  no  change  of  form  without  its  destruction  and  removal ; 
there  is  only  given  a  change  of  figure.  These  changes  of 
state  are  called  changes  of  modes  '^  for  these  changes  them- 
selves produce  among  themselves  new  forms,  which  are  prop- 
erly called  modifications,  but  in  the  animal  body,  sensations. 
By  means  of  such  changes  imaginations  are  effected,  for 
these  are  so  many  ideas,  which  are  reproduced  by  similar 
changes  of  state.  For  this  reason  modifications  correspond 
to  sensations :  for  changes  are  either  of  forces  or  of  modes. 
The  perfection  of  superior  forms  consists  in  mutability  of 
state,  or  of  states ;  for  the  soul,  from  any  change  of  any 
organic  form  in  its  own  body,  understands  the  state  of  it  and 
what  it  signifies ;  for,  without  change  of  some  kind,  no  sen- 
sation is  given  and  no  perception,  still  less  any  action.  From 
changes  of  state,  or  variation  of  modes,  new  forms  exist,  thus 
successively,  before  they  do  simultaneously,  or  before  they 
co-exist;  for,  there  may  be  given  common  states,  under 
which  are  contained  many  particular  ones,— universal  states, 
beneath  which  are  singular  ones,— and  general  states, 
including  specific  and  individual  ones.  A  common  and 
universal  state  is  formed  from  those  which  are  particular 
and  singular.     There  are  equations  which  are  composed  suc- 


cessively  by  reasonings  and  analogies.  On  the  same  principle 
we  reason,  that,  while  in  finite  existences  there  can  be  given 
several  states  at  the  same  time  which  are  not  self-created, 
there  are  infinitely  more  in  superior  forms. 


CHAPTEE  V. 


SUBSTANCE. 


Wolf.  Substance  is  an  indestructible  and  modifiable  sub- 
ject ;  or  it  is  the  subject  of  intrinsic  determinations  constant 
and  variable ;  or,  substance  is  a  subject  in  which  the  essentials 
and  attributes  are  the  same,  while  its  modes  are  successively 
varied.  Aristotle.  It  is  an  ens  which  subsists  of  itself 
and  sustains  accidents.  Leibnitz,  to  the  ordinary  notion  of 
substance,  adds  that  of  action  as  its  genuine  characteristic,  so 
that  by  its  power  of  acting  it  may  properly  be  distinguished 
from  accidents.  Descartes  defines  substance  as  a  thing 
which  so  exists  that  it  needs  no  other  thing  for  its  own  ex- 
istence. Such  is  his  idea  of  God.  Clauberg  in  like  manner 
understands  substance  as  a  thing  which  so  exists  it  needs  no 
other  subject  for  its  own  existence;  moreover  that  its  opposite 
is  accident,  which  exists,  as  it  were,  in  some  other  subject  or 
whose  esse  is  to  be  in  something.  But,  according  to  the  school- 
men, God  is  not  in  predicates,  but  is  above  all  predicates. 
Locke  adheres  to  the  common  notion  of  substance  and  does  not 
vance  beyond  it,  while  he  calls  it  the  substratum  or  basis  of 
qualities,  which  have  the  power  of  producing  in  us  simple 
ideas,  and  which  are  commonly  called  accidents.  Wolf.  The 
common  notion  of  substance  is  imaginary.  The  state  of  sub- 
stance can  be  changed ;  whence  we  infer  that  substances  are 
endowed  with  force.  In  substances,  whose  state  is  actually 
changed,  there  is  a  continuous  attempt  at  action.  Accidents 
cannot  exist  without  substances.  In  a  compound  entity 
nothing  substantial  is  given  except  simple  entities.  There 
are  no  substances  except  simple  substances,  and  compound 

8 


18 


ONTOLOGY. 


SUBSTANCE. 


19 


entities  are  aggregates  of  simple  substances.  Therefore  simple 
substance  only  is  properly  substance.  It  is,  however,  m  ac- 
cordance witli  established  usage  to  call  all  compound  en^ties, 
in  the  material  world,  substances.  Robert  Green,  an  Eng- 
lishman, argues  that  substance  differs  from  accident  in  the 
possession  of  active  force.  If  there  be  force  in  a  compound 
substance,  it  should  result  from  the  forces  of  the  simple  sub- 
stances composing  it.  ,  .  i  •  i 
In  the  modifications  of  things  nothing  substantial  perishes 

or  is  produced.     Wolf. 

Substance  is  that  which  in  itself  possesses  its  -own  esse. 
Primary  substances  are  such  primarily,  properly  and  princi- 
pally ;  they  are  individual  entities,  singular  substances  and 
the  fundamentals  of  all  things,  which  are  in  theni  and  which 
are  predicated  of  them.  Secondary  universal  substances  are 
genera  and  species.  They  are  by  this  author  divided  into 
most  universal,  universal,  generic,  specific  and  individual 
He  supr)Oses  primary  substances  to  be  accidents :  also  tliat 
there  are  given  spiritual  and  incorporeal  substances,  as,  angels 

and  souls.     Dupleix. 

That  subject  in  which  exist  all  those  things  which  we  hnd 
meeting  in  a  real  thing  we  call  substance.     When  we  con- 
sider this,  of  what  quality  it  is,  we  are  able  to  attribute 
nothing    to   it,    because   we    may    remove   all   its   qualities 
from  it  and  include  them  among  accidents.     The  substan- 
tial  of  things  is  therefore  said  to  be  unknown,      ihus  the 
notion  of  substance  is  imaginary,  and  consequently  substance 
itself,  such   as  we  commonly  imagine   it,  is   an   imaginary 
ens      Descartes  has   well  observed  that  substance  cannot 
be   conceived   of,   unless   by    means   of  a   certain   primary 
determination,  to  which  all   the   other   determinations   are 
referred :  although  he  may  not  be  regarded  as  having  pro- 
gressed so  far,  so  long  as  he  holds  extension  to  be  the  tun- 
damental  constituent  of  corporeal  substance,  and  thought, 
that  of  incorporeal  substance,  since  something  more  universal 
is  given  in  each.     If  the  state  of  substances  is  changed,  that 
they  are  endowed  with  force,  follows  of  necessity.     Let  us 
suppose  that  only  one  substance  exists,  and  that  its  state  is 
changed ;  there  will  be  given  in  that  substance  a  sufficient 
reason  of  that  change,  and  so  action  will  be  given ;  where- 


fore, since,  in  a  thing  which  acts,  there  must  be  admitted 
something  which  contains  in  itself  a  sufficient  reason  of  the 
actuality  of  the  action,  and  so,  a  certain  force ;  as  a  conse- 
quence, substance  itself  must  be  endowed  with  force. 

Wolf. 

Substances  like  forms  are  simple  and  compound,  prior  and 
posterior,  superior  and  inferior ;  but  properly  speaking  and 
with  regard  to  first  principles,  there  are  no  substances  given, 
except  such  as  are  simple,  first  and  supreme,  which  are  at  the 
same  time  the  most  perfect.     Yet  posterior  and  compound 
substances  must  also  be  called  substances,  in  so  far  as  forms, 
attributes,  changes,  modes,  accidents  and  qualities  appertain 
to  them.     In  like  manner,  every  form  distinct  from  others  is 
a  substance  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  subject  in  which  form  resides, 
and  in  so  far  as  it  is  adjoined  to  and  predicated  of  form. 
Thus  substance  remains  substance,  although  the  state  of  its 
form  be  changed.    For  nothing  substantial  perishes  or  is  pro- 
duced by  variation  or  modification  of  form.    In  this  all  defini- 
tions can  coincide ;  but  to  give  a  single  definition,  which  shall 
exhaust  all  the  qualities  of  substance,  I  scarcely  believe  to  be 
possible,  yet  that  they  all  do  coincide  can  be  shown.     In 
superior  substances,  predicates,  accidents  and  qualities  have 
no  place,  for  these  are  above  all  notion  of  predicates. 

In  order  that  there  may  be  substances,  they  must  be  modi- 
fiable and  able  to  change  their  states,  thus  they  must  be  en- 
dowed with  force.  The  modifications  themselves,  which  are 
changes  of  state,  or  variations  of  forces,  aUhough  they  are 
forms,  can  by  no  means  be  called  substances,  but  the  opera- 
tions of  substance ;  for,  regarded  in  themselves,  the  modifi- 
cations are  not  modifiable  and  cannot  change  their  state, 
being  only  the  operations  of  substances,  which  latter  do 
change  their  states.  Thus,  thought  cannot  be  called  sub- 
stance, nor  can  sensation.  For  the  sensory  organs  are  the 
very  substance  of  the  sensations ;  viz. :  the  eye  is  the  organic 


20 


DNTOLOOr. 


substance  of  the  sensation  of  sight;  the  ear,  of  hearing;  the 
tongue,  of  taste ;  the  brain,  of  all  the  sensations ;  also,  the 
cortical  glands  are  the  organic  substances  of  the  imagina- 
tion, and  alo7iff  with  what  is  purely  of  the  understanding  they 
belong  to  thought.  Therefore  the  sensories  are  substances, 
because  they  are  organic  forms ;  sensations,  however,  are  not. 
The  whole  body  is  a  substance  composed  of  all  organic  sub- 
stances. The  soul  is  a  substance  whose  operations  are  spiritual, 
for  it  is  a  form  and  indeed  a  spiritual  form.  In  like  manner 
with  other  things.  Active  and  motive  force  ought  to  be  con- 
ceived of  as  like  substance,  though  of  another  nature.  It  is 
not  substance,  however,  but  only  appears  so. 


CHAPTER   VI. 


MATTER— MATEKIAL. 

All  matter  is  in  continual  motion.  If  matter  does  not 
chano-e  its  place  it  is  owing  to  the  resistance  of  contiguous 
things.  The  active  force  in  a  body  should  be  conceived  to  be 
quite  as  durable  as  the  matter  in  it.  Matter  and  active  force 
are  not  substances.  In  the  elements  are  contained  the  ulti- 
mate reasons  of  those  things  which  are  discerned  in  material 
things ;  consequently  in  simple  substances  is  contained  the 
ultimate  reason  why  matter  and  active  force  appear  as  two 
substances  diverse  from  each  other.  That  which  is  deter- 
mined in  a  compound  ens  is  called  matter ;  whence  a  com- 
pound 6718  is  said  to  consist  of  matter.  The  word  matter  is 
taken  more  widely,  so  as  to  designate  the  substantial,  because 
by  means  of  essential  determinations  it  is  made  specific,  so  that 
this  particuhir  ens  comes  forth,  and  not  another ;  but  from 
this  looser  signification  we  very  properly  abstain,  lest  while 
attributing  matter  to  simple  substances  in  its  transcendental 
signification,  we  may  seem  to  attribute  it  to  them  in  its  phys- 


i  J 


MA  TTER—MA  TERIAL. 


21 


f 


t 


ical  signification,  which  latter  obtains  in  common  speech,  and 
is  contained  in  the  definition  of  it.  Matter  therefore  is  called 
matter  from  which  [ex  qud^,  to  distinguish  it  from  a  sub- 
ject, which  latter  is  called  matter  in  which  [in  qua],  and 
to  distinguish  it  from  an  object,  which  last  is  termed  matter 
about  which  [circa  quani].  Wolf. 

Matter  is  presented  to  our  consideration  in  three  modes. 
1.  That  it  is  the  subject  and  seat  of  form  and  accidents:  thus, 
the  body  is  the  seat  of  the  rational  soul,  which  is  its  form,  and 
of  many  accidents.     2.  In  so  far  as  anything  is  made  out  of 
it ;  as,  out  of  wood.     3.  As  the  subject  of  an  agent ;  as  wood, 
of  fire.     Thus  we  have  matter  in  which,  out  of  which,  and  by 
means  of  which.     Primal  matter  is  sometimes  considered  as 
without  form  and  accident,  and  then  it  is  mental ;  but  natural 
matter  is  first  without  form,  and  is,  as  it  were,  before  form  and 
the  subject  of  form  and  accidents.     Secondary  matter  is  an 
effect,  it  being  joined  to  primal  form.     If  we  speak  of  matter 
as  the  principle  of  natural  causes,  we  understand  only  primal 
matter.     Primal  matter  when  under  consideration  is  abstruse 
and  obscure.     The  ancient  philosophers  said  that  it  was  not, 
and  could  not  be  understood  in  the  nature  of  tilings,  unless 
by  means  of  an  indirect  and  imperfect  conception.     Such  was 
Plato's  mode  of  expressing  it.     Aristotle's  thus:  that  that 
which  must  be  considered  as  without  form  and  accidents, 
must  be  understood  by  means  of  analogy  and  similitude,  as 
you  understand  the  light  by  means  of  which  you  perceive 
things  to  be.     Aristotle  says  that  matter  is  the  primal  sub- 
ject, from  which  all  things  subsist ;  that  all  things  are  born 
at  the  outset  from  themselves  and  not  by  means  of  another, 
and  that  matter  is  that  ultimate  part  into  which  things  are  re- 
solved and  terminated.     If  we  consider  the  evident  order  of 
the  creation  of  the  world,  we  necessarily  conceive  of  matter 
before  form,  as  of  something  underlying  and  fundamental, 
from  which,  by  changes  and  by  series,  forms  come  forth. 
Just  as  the  Physicists  say  that  form  is  derived  from^  the 
potency  of  matter,  or  from  a  natural  faculty,  potency,  dispo- 
sition, and  aptitude,  which  is  in  it,  for  successively  receiving 
forms.     They  say  that  man  alone  and  his  form  do  not  result 
from  matter.     Aristotle  also  knew  that  this  form  came  from 
some  other  source  than  from  matter.    In  passing  he  asserts  that 


22 


ONTOLOGY. 


primal  matter  is  separated  from  all  form,  and  that  thence 
results  all  form.  Dupleix. 

Matter  is  extent  endowed  with  the  force  of  inertia.  Mat- 
ter is  modified  by  variation  of  figure.  A  substantiated  phe- 
nomenon is  one  which  appears  Hke  a  substance.  Matter  and 
motive  force  are  substantiated  phenomena ;  yet  motive  force 
and  matter  necessarily  appear  as  diverse  substances.  Many 
of  the  schoolmen  however  placed  these  in  contrast,  also  re- 
garding tliem  as  material  and  immaterial  substances;  for 
example,  when  they  said  that  the  soul  was  simple,  they  called 
that  sim])le,  which  is  not  composed  of  quantitative  parts. 
Unity  is  not  a  number,  but  is  the  principle  of  all  numbers. 

Wolf. 

That  is  called  3Iatter  {materia)  which  is  determined  in 
order  that  form  may  exist,  or,  it  is  that  from  which  form 
exists ;  for  without  matter  no  determinations  can  be  given, 
and  hence,  no  form ;  so  that  if  from  form  you  take  away 
matter,  nothing  remains,  and  its  substance  falls  into  nothing ; 
just  as  if  you  were  to  take  away  the  viscera  from  the  body, 
or  the  stones  from  a  house,  which  are  therefore  called  mate- 
rials. It  w^as  in  this  sense  that  the  ancients  accepted  the 
word  matter — so  likewise,  the  men  of  our  time,  although 
they  are  unwilling  to  confound  it  with  the  Substantial. 

Anything  Material  {materiale),  on  the  other  hand,  ac- 
cording to  every  use  of  speaking,  is  to-day  that  which  is 
heavy,  endowed  with  the  force  of  inertia,  and  which  is  in 
space.  The  word  by  usage  is  taken  from  stones,  marble, 
woods,  and  similar  things,  which  are  called  materials,  but 
to  these  only  so  far  as  they  are  inanimate  and  dense.  The 
same  word  by  no  means  applies  to  simple  things,  such  as  are 
spiritual  substances  and  others.  Wherefore,  in  order  to  avoid 
contradictions  and  disputes,  a  distinction  is  made  between 
primal  elements,  and  substances,  which  is  the  reason  that 
such  substances  are  called  immaterial,  that  is,  not  heavy  and 
inert,  not  partaking  of  motion,  part,  or  extent.     But  in  order 


\ 


MA  TTER—MA  TERIAL. 


23 


that  dispute  on  this  point  may  be  avoided,  it  should  be  fully 
defined  what  matter  is,  and  then  what  is  material,  according 
to  the  common  understanding  and  received  usage. 

Matter,  philosophically  understood,  may  be  attributed  even 
to  spiritual  forms,  for  matter  is  that  from  which  form  is, 
whether  you  term  it  substance  or  element.     Without  matter 
from  wdiicli  [ex  qua],  form  never  exists:  just  as  w^ithout 
object,  there  is  no  sensation,  for  matter  is  the  very  subject 
which  is  determined.    Moreover  we  speak  of  a  ''  matter  of 
dispute,"  and  a  matter  of  dispute  is  not  anything  material. 
Thus  we  have  matter  philosophical,  physiological,  and  theo- 
logical.    Therefore  matter  philosophically  considered  is  not 
supposed  to  be  heavy,  inert,  and  corporeal,  but  is  regarded 
as  the  principle  of  being,  and  that  without  wdiich  there  is  no 
determination  and  no  form ;  for  that  something  which  is  de- 
termined is  called  matter.     On  the   other  hand,  physical 
matter,  or   material,  is   only  that  w^hich   is   found  in    the 
lowest  forms,  especially  in  angular  form  and  in  the  earth. 
Material  of  this  kind  begins  to  be  put  off  by  superior  forms, 
for,  the  less  it  is  finited,  the  less  it  becomes  material.     Thus, 
the  soul  is  not  material,  which  is  without  part,  extent,  figure, 
gravity,  but  it  does  not  cease  to  be  matter,  that  is,  the  prin- 
ciple from  which  the  body  exists,  nor  does  the  soul  itself 
cease  to  exist  and  subsist  from  its  own  matter,  or  principle, 
so  far  as  it  is  a  form.     Form  without  matter  is  not  an  ens,  is 
not  determined,  still  less  is  it  determinable.     But  the  matter 
of  the  soul  must  not  according  to  the  vulgar  acceptation  and 
in  a  grossly  physical  sense,  be  conceived  of  as  material. 

From  these  things  it  appears  how  ideas  purely  critical  may 
confuse  a  subject,  and  how  the  mere  signification  of  a  word 
may  protract  a  discussion.  All  such  niceties,  however,  are 
mere  puerile  ornamentations,  and  ill  become  men. 


. 


24 


ONTOLOGY. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

EXTENT— EXTENSION— CONTINUOUS— CONTIGUOUS— PART. 

If  we  represent  to  ourselves  several  things  diverse  from, 
and  existing  outside  of,  each  other,  as  if  they  were  in  one, 
the  notion  of  extension  arises ;  so  that  extension  is  the  co- 
existence in  one,  of  many  and  diverse  existences,  or  if  you 
prefer  it,  of  things  existing  outside  of  each  other ;  and  in- 
deed is  constituted  by  the  union  of  many  things  existing  out- 
side of  each  other ;  thus  it  is  required  for  the  notion  of  exten- 
sion that  they  be  united  among  themselves,  and  that  they  form 
a  one.  Since  in  an  extent  there  are  many  things,  wliich  taken 
too-ether  constitute  the  same  with  itself  taken  as  a  unit,  and 
indeed  which  constitute  the  extent  itself,  every  extent  has 
parts,  each  of  which  exists  outside  of  another,  and  which  are 
united  among  themselves.  That  which  has  parts,  one  of 
which  exists  outside  of  another,  and  which  are  united  among 
themselves,  is  an  extent.  Jungius  defines  extension  as  that, 
on  account  of  w^hich  corporeal  substance  has  part  outside  of 
part.  Clauberg  defines  body  or  extent  (which,  witli  a  dis- 
ciple of  Descartes,  are  synonymous  terms),  as  that  which  has 
part  placed  outside  of  part.  Of  the  union  of  tlie  parts  tliey 
make  no  mention,  nevertheless,  they  tacitly  suppose  it,  be- 
cause they  conceive  of  extension  in  a  body  as  being  parts, 
and  those  parts  as  being  united  among  themselves.  Un- 
limited parts  of  extent  regarded  in  the  abstract,  do  not  differ 
except  in  number.  To  a  right  line  we  do  not  attribute  ex- 
tension except  regarded  in  the  abstract.  Indeed  the  parts  of 
a  line  do  hot  differ  except  in  number.  The  case  is  the  same 
with  a  solid  or  mathematical  body ;  but  extent  of  this  kind 
is  not  given  in  the  nature  of  things.  A,  B,  and  G  however 
they  be  taken  in  extent  regarded  in  the  abstract,  differ  m 
none  of  their  qualities,  nor  are  intrinsic  diverse  determinations 
found  in  them,  unless  in  each  one's  having  existence  proper 
to  itself.     Wolf's  Ontology. 

Contiguous  things  are   not  continuous.      Continuity  ex- 
cludes the  possible  existence  of  a  part  diverse  from,  and  m- 


EXTENT-EXTENSION-  CONTINUO  US-CONTIG  UO  US— PART.      25 

terraediate  between  two  other  parts  given  next  to  itself. 
That  which  is  interrupted  or  not  continuous  renders  actual 
or  possible  the  existence  of  a  part,  diverse  from  and  interme- 
diate between  two  given  parts.  Two  limited  extents  are 
called  contiguous,  whose  surfaces  mutually  touch  each  other, 
so  that  they  remain  two,  and  by  no  means  form  one  extent. 
So,  contiguity  excludes  the  actual  existence  of  an  interme- 
diate third.    Nothing,  however,  prevents  a  third  extent  from 

beins  placed  between  contiguous  extents. 

""  ^  Wolf's  Ontol. 

The  elements  of  material  things  exist  outside  of  each  other 
and  are  united  to  each  other.  Aggregates  of  elements  are 
extended ;  they  are  also  continuous.  Every  body  arises  from 
that  which  is  not  extended,  nevertheless  itself  is  extended, 
for  the  elements  themselves  of  things  material  are  not  ex- 
tended. Extension  and  continuity  in  a  body  you  do  riot  per- 
ceive unless  confusedly.  Extension  and  continuity  are 
phenomena:  for  whatever  is  perceived  confusedly,  by  way 
of  the  senses,  is  called  a  phenomenon.     Wolf's  Cosmology. 

An  actual  part  is  one  which  is  contained  by  its  own  limits ; 
a  possible  part  is  one  whose  limits  may  be  assigned  at  will. 
In  the  continuous  regarded  in  the  abstract,  parts  are  only 
possible,  not  actual.  But  in  a  continuous  series  of  contig- 
uous things,  the  parts  are  actual.  Contiguous  parts  consti- 
tute what  is  continuous.     Wolf. 

Bxtoit  is  defined  as  that  which  has  parts  outside  of  parts, 
and  thus  is  to  be  united.  It  is  commonly  believed  that  no 
form  can  be  given,  which  does  not  consist  of  parts  outside  of 
parts,  for  there  must  be  something  to  be  determined,  in  order 
that  form  may  exist,  and  this  something  we  conceive  of  as  a 
part.  But  let  us  see  of  what  quality  an  extent  ought  to  be, 
which  should  be  said  to  consist  of  parts,  and  of  what  quality 
one  which  is  without  parts.  In  every  inferior  and  more  im- 
perfect form,  there  is  given  extent  which  consists  of  parts,  or 
material  extent,  or,  what  comes  to  the  same  thing,  extension 
of  matter.  Therefore  bodies  are  such  extents.  But  in 
superior  forms  extension  cannot  be  denied,  so  far  as  there 

4 


26 


ONTOLOGY, 


IS  form,  and  so  far  as  there  are  essential  determinations,  and 
so  far  as  form  is  actual  and  not  ideal,  and  in  the  concrete ;  to 
say  that  it  is  without  extent,  would  he  to  say  that  it  is  non- 
existent, or  an  ens  not  possible  in  nature.     Such  an  extent 
cannot  be  said  to  consist  of  parts,  nor  of  parts  outside  of 
parts,  nor  with   the   idea   of  breadth,  length,   and    depth. 
Hence  it  is  not  corporeal.     1.  Such  an  extent  does  not  con- 
sist of  parts ;  for  parts,  if  they  are  contained  within  their 
own  boundaries,  are  figured,  elementary,  heavy,  inert,  ter- 
restrial forms ;  while  there  are  none  such  in  an  extent  not 
material,  but  they  are  either  substances  or  forms,  or  if  you 
prefer  so  to  express  it,  they  are  such  things  as  are  deter- 
mined;  and  those  things,  forms,  or  substances,  are  of  no 
fio-ure,  gravity,  or  any  material  predicate.     2.  Nor  does  such 
an  extent  consist  of  parts  outside  of  parts  ;  for,  what  is  out- 
side will  be  either  above,  below,  or  at  the  sides ;  and  a  place 
will  then  be  given  either  at  the  centre,  or  in  the  surface,  or 
somewhere,  when,  in  the  form,  tlie  before  mentioned  rela- 
tions may  have  perished,  as  in  the  circle ;  for  who  will  sup- 
pose any  part  of  a  circle  to  be  above  or  below  another?     3. 
Wherefore  there  perishes  the  idea  of  breadth,  length,  and 
depth  ;  but  that  idea  perishes  in  the  form,  so  also  the  idea  of 
extent'  such  as  has  been  described,  but  there  does  not  perish 
the  idea  of  space,  and  thus  of  extent  outside  of  the  form  ;  for 
whatever  is  in  it  is  without  place  in  itself,  but  not  without 
place  in  the  universe,  outside  of  itself. 

Therefore  every  form  is  extended,  even  supreme  and 
spiritual  form,  but  it  does  not  consist  of  parts  such  as  are 
parts  terrastrial,  and  forms  angular,  heavy,  and  inert,  and 
such  as  are  the  elements  of  material  things ;  but  they  consist 
of  substances  or  forms  which  are  determined,  for  there  will 
be  something  determinable  and  determined,  which  must  be 

the  analogue  of  part. 

Therefore  such  extent  is  not  material,  so  far  as  material  is 


BODY— THINGS  CORPOREAL. 


27 


described  as  consisting  of  parts  which  are  heavy  and  inert ; 
but  it  ought  rather  to  be  spoken  of  as  pure  or  substantial 
extent,  for  bodies  are  aggregates  of  substances. 

Substances  themselves,  considered  as  parts  in  such  forms, 
are  without  the  idea  of  place,  and  of  tendency  towards  a 
centre,  or  periphery,  upwards,  or  downwards,  thus  there 
perishes  the  idea  of  breadth  and  length,  such  as  is  proper  to 

every  extent. 

This  extent,  itself  not  material,  cannot  be  said  to  occupy 
space  in  itself,  but  that  which  is  without  it  is  said  to  oc- 
cupy space ;  for  while  within  it,  there  is  no  respect  of  centre 
and  place,  still  it  occupies,  space  in  the  universe. 

Part  signifies  that  which  is  of  a  form  angular,  terrestrial, 
and  figured.  Thiis  the  elements  of  material  things  are 
parts;  and  because  angular  forms  can  put  on  the  face  and 
surface  of  superior  forms,  as  the  circle  and  the  spiral,  there- 
fore even  a  circular  part  is  called  a  part ;  but  if  it  should  be 
purely  circular  and  spiral,  it  would  immediately  cease  to  be 
such  a  part. 


•  • 


CHAPTER    VIII. 


BODY— THINGS  CORPOREAL. 

Primitive  corpuscles  are  those  in  which  no  reason  of 
their  composition  can  be  assigned  except  in  their  elements. 
Derivative  corpuscles  are  those  whose  reason  of  composition  is 
in  lesser  ones.  Visible  bodies  all  consist  of  derivative  cor- 
puscles. The  reason  of  the  composition  of  those  which  come 
together  in  visible  bodies,  is  contained  in  the  qualities  of 
the  derivative  corpuscles,  and  in  the  mode  in  which  the 
same  are  joined  together.     Bodies  are  compound  substances. 

Wolf. 

Body  is  a  word  of  several  meanings.    It  signifies,  1.  Quan' 


I' 


23  .  ONTOLOGY. 

tity,  and,  in  a  mathematical  sense,  is  put  for  the  three  dimen- 
sions of  body  conjoined  with  or  united  to  solidity  and  matter, 
and  sometimes  altogether  abstracted  therefrom.  2.  Corporeal 
substance ;  as,  man,  tree,  stone,  thus  in  a  physical  sense ; 
(vrivficial  bodies,  as  houses,  statues,  or,  all  the  works  of  art, 
not  nature's  ;  also  natural  bodies,  3.  When  applied  to  arti- 
ficial things,  it  is  matter  joined  to  form  and  thus  the  entire 
body.  4.  When  applied  to  natural  things,  it  is  primal  matter 
or  the  subject  of  natural  form,  which  is  of  itself  formless,  but 
for  the  most  part  susceptible  of  many  and  diverse  forms 
successively.  Natural  bodies  are  divided  among  themselves 
into  simple,  which  are  not  composed  of,  or  mixed  with  the 
matter  of  another  body,  and  into  compound  and  mixed, 

DUPLEIX. 

Material  bodies  are  all  those  which  arise  from  the  elements 
of  things  material  or  from  so  many  very  minute  triangular 
or  square  particles ;  thus  they  are  all  angular  forms,  of  what- 
ever figure  as  well  as  composition  they  may  be.  For  those 
triangular  and  square  particles  are  primitive  corpuscles,  yea, 
the  very  elements  themselves,  from  whose  aggregates  material 
bodies  arise  and  are  derived. 

But  animate  bodies  are  all  compound  substances  and  forms, 
from  their  first  to  their  last  natural  order,  derived,  and  thus, 
compounded  ;  but  one  substantial  reigns  in  that  whole  body, 
that  is  the  soul,  and  besides  this  substantial  there  is  given 
none  other  force  in  this  body.  Therefore  these  bodies  are 
compound  substances,  or  simple  substam^e  alone,  which  is 
their  soul,  and  which,  by  derivation,  forms  its  own  body. 
But  what  body  is,  has  been  shown  above. 

Each  body  has  its  own  soul,  which  is  wholly  in  every  part 
of  it,  and  which  has  formed  its  body  after  its  own  image. 
Other  things  which  have  been  added  were  taken  from  the 
mineral  kingdom. 


ESSENCE— ESSENTIALS. 


29 


I ' 


CHAPTER    IX. 


ESSENCE— ESSENTIALS. 


Essence  is  distinguished  from  the  other  qualities  which 
reside  in  an  eiis,  because,  while  it  has  no  intrinsic  reason  why 
it  should  enter  into  the  ens,  but  ought  to  be  regarded  as  the 
first  thing  in  it,  the  other  qualities  which  are  therein  or  may 
be  therein,  have  a  reason  for  being  in  the  same.     Therefore 
essence  may  be  defined  as  that  which  is  first  conceivod  con- 
cerning an  ens,  and  in  which  is  contained  a  sufiicient  reason 
why  the  other  qualities  are  actually  in  it,  or  may  be  in  it. 
SuAREZ  says  that  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  that  which  is  first 
and  radical,  and  the  inmost  principle  of  all  the  actions  and 
properties  which  appertain    to   the  thing.     Afterwards   he 
asserts  that  it  is  that  which  is  conceived  first  to  belong  to, 
and  first  to  be  constituted  in,  the  esse  of  a  thing,  and  of  such 
a  thing  as  it  is.     Again,  that  real  essence  is  the  principle 
or  root  of  real  operations  or  effects.     Descartes  says  that 
essence  is  that  leading  property  of  any  substance,  which  con- 
stitutes its  very  nature  and  essence,  and  to  which  all  the 
other  properties  are  referred :     Clauberg. — Of  all  the  prop- 
erties which  are  attributed  to  any  given  thing,  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  consider  one  as  first,  chief,  and  inmost  to  the  thing, 
which  in  a  manner  embraces  all  the  other  properties,  or  is 
certainly,  as  it  were,  their  root  and  foundation.     This  es- 
pecial thing  we  call  the  essence,  and  with   respect  to  the 
properties  and  operations  thence  proceeding,  we  also  call  it 
the  nature  of  the  thing,  but  thus  our  ideas  of  essence  and  of 
nature  become  confused.     Wolf. — Those  properties  in  an  ens 
which  are  not  mutually  inconsistent,  and  which,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  not  determined  by  each  other,  are  called  essentials, 
and  constitute  the  essence  of  an  ens.     For  example,  the  num- 
ber three,  and  equality  of  the  sides  are  the  essentials  of  an 
equilateral  triangle ;  and  in  morals  it  is  a  truth  not  inconsistent 
with  itself  that  an  action  conformable  to  natural  law  may  arise 
from  a  habit  of  the  will.     Essence  is  the  first  thing  which  is 


% 


sA 


■^^-■■W^i 


ESSENCE— ESSENTIA  LS. 


31 


30 


ONTOLOGY. 


II 


H 


conceived  about  an  ens,  and  without  it  an  ens  cannot  be.     If 
anything  is  determined  by  means  of  essentials,  that  ought 
constantly  to  be  in  the  ens.     If  anything  is  not  determined 
by  essentials,  and  yet  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  same,  that 
thing  may  be  in  the  ens,  although  it  be  not  actually  in  it : 
on  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  inconsistent  with  those  same  essen- 
tials, it  cannot  be  in  the  ens.    For  example :  it  does  not  follow 
that  a  line  drawn  from  the  vertex  to  the  base  of  a  triangle  is 
so  determined  by  essentials,  because  it  can  be  so  drawn  after 
the  triangle  is  constructed.     But  it  is  inconsistent  with  an 
obtuse-angled  triangle  that  one  of  its  angles  be  a  right  angle. 
Again  :  there  is  no  inconsistency  in  a  stone's  being  white,  but 
there  is  inconsistency  in  its  being  lighter  than  air.     That 
which  is  not  inconsistent  with  essentials,  and  yet  is  by  no 
means  determined  by  essentials,  by  the  author  is  called  mode, 
by  the  schoolmen,  predicable  accident.     Whatsoever  resides 
in  an  ens,  that  has  a  place  either  among  its  essentials,  or  its 
attributes,  or  its  modes.    Those  things  which  constantly  reside 
in  an  ens,  and  are  not  determined  by  other  things  which  are  in 
it  at  the  same  time,  are  in  the  number  of  its  essentials :  but 
those  which  are  constantly  in  it,  and  are  determined  by  other 
things  which  are  in  it  at  the  same  time,  are  attributes.     By 
means  of  its  essence  an  ens  is  possible.     We  understand  the 
essence  of  an  ens,  when  we  understand  the  fii-st  mode  by  which 
it  can  come  into  existence,  consequently  by  a  genitive  defini- 
tion.    Why  the  essentials  are  in  the  ens,  no  intrinsic  reason 
can  be  given,  whence  it  may  be  understood  why  the  same 
are  in  it,  as  why  an  equilateral  triangle  has  three  sides.  ^  In 
the  essence  of  an  ens  is  contained  the  reason  of  those  things 
which,  besides  itself,  are  either  constantly  in  the  same,  or 
can  be  in  it.     All  similar  things  have  the  same  essence,  and 
the  essentials  are  similar,  if  the  essence  be  similar.     Essences 
of  things  are  like  rational  or  common  whole  numbers.     1  or  a 
number  is  a  combination  of  units  which,  while  they  can  be,  are 
not  at  the  same  time  necessarily,  combined.     Nevertheless, 
while  necessity  does  not  oppose,  no  unit  can  be  taken  from,  and 
none  added  to  the  number,  while  it  remains  intact.     Essences 
of  things  are  immutable :  so  that  if,  as  it  were,  any  essential  be 
taken  away,  or  some  other  superadded,  the  essence  no  longer 
remains  the  essence  of  that  ens,  to  which  it  had  before  be- 


longed, but  is  changed  into  the  essence  of  a  diverse  ens.  Es- 
sences of  things  are  immutable.  The  necessity  which  arises 
from  the  essence  of  an  ens  is  absolute,  but  that  which  proceeds 
from  another  source  does  not  exist,  except  hypothetically.  Es- 
sences of  things  are  absolutely  necessary.  Essentials  are  qual- 
ities, consequentlv  genera  and  species  are  determined  by 
qualities.  Individuals  have  the  same  essentials,  so  far  as  they 
are  contained  under  the  same  species,  and  species  and  inferior 
genera  have  the  same  essentials,  so  far  as  the  species  are  con- 
tained under  the  same  genus,  and  the  inferior  genera,  under 
the  same  superior  genus.  Species  and  genera  differ  by  means 
of  essentials,  which,  while  tlie  other  essentials  remain  the 
same,  can  be  determined  in  a  different  manner.  Constant 
intrinsic  determinations  are  essentials  and  attributes :  modes 
however  are  variable.  Wolf's  07itol. 

Essence  is  in  all  things  and  is  most  general,  which  is  the 
reason  that  it  can  with  difficulty  be  defined ;  for  that  which 
is,  as  it  were,  by  all  clearly  conceived  in  individual  things, 
by  definition  becomes  obscure.  Nor  can  it  be  presented  by 
a  single  definition  which  shall  exhaust  everything  which  is 
in  the  whole  of  it ;  wherefore  we  must  approach  the  subject 
in  another  way,  and  by  examples  solely,  arrive  at  a  clear 
understanding  of  essence  and  of  things  similar.  We  may 
then  form  partial  definitions  which  can  be  combined  into  one 
manifest  general  definition. 

The  most  general  definition  of  essence  is  this,  namely : 
Essence  is  essence ;  or  this :  It  is  what  it  is.  Nothing  can 
be  defined  by  means  of  itself  except  essence ;  for  besides  it 
there  is  nothing  in  a  subject  which  properly  belongs  to  it 
But  this  amounts  to  nothing,  as  a  definition. 

In  every  ens  there  seems  to  be  given  its  esse,  its  essence 
and  its  essential,  and  that  one  flows  from  the  other,  or  that 
one  supposes  the  other.  1.  The  esse  of  a  form  in  a  universal 
sense  is  matter,  its  essential  is  its  determination,  its  essence  is 
the  form  itself.    2.  The  things  which  constitute  the  essence  of 


'liiiML 


32 


ONTOLOGY. 


a  circle  are  its  periphery,  its  diameters,  and  its  centre.   With- 
out these  there  is  no  circle ;  and  if  they  are  not  in  it,  they 
must  be  supposed  to  be  in  it.     3.  The  essence  of  a  triangle  is 
that  it  consists  of  three  sides  and  three  angles.    4.  But  the  es- 
sence of  form  resides  in  each  single  form  as  its  universal,  nor 
does  it  recede  therefrom ;  thus  every  principal  essence  is  de- 
duced from  that  which  is  first  and  supreme  or  universal.     5. 
The  essence  of  an  animal  is  that  it  enjoys  a  soul  and  a  body. 
This  holds  good  in  all  genera  and  species.     6.  Human  es- 
sence, besides  the  specific  properties  already  mentioned,  is  tliat 
it  enjoys  a  rational  mind ;  otherwise  it  is  not  man.     7.  The 
very  universal  essence  in  every  body  is  the  soul,  whence  is 
derived  the  body.     She  rules  in  all  particulars.     Thus  there 
are  given,  as  it  were,  differences  of  essence  which  are  specific 
and  singular.    Thus  we  say  that  this  is  the  essence  or  the  soul 
of  a  thing.    If  the  essence  or  soul  of  a  tiling  recedes,  the  thing 
dies.    8.  The  essentials  of  a  muscle  are  its  fibres.    Specifically 
they  are  the  fibres  determined  in  a  peculiar  manner,  or  the 
form.    Thus  essence  and  form  will  agree.    Therefore  the  reign- 
ing essence  in  all  things  is  called  their  soul,  which  is  in  all 
things  from  the  very  beginning,  and  is  the  very  beginning. 
The  other  things  which  depend  upon  it  are  its  body.    But  the 
essence  of  the  body  is  the  form  which  is  made  up  of  the 
naked  essential  determinations  or  those  of  the  soul.     The  es- 
sence of  a  special  form  occurs  in  the  word  itself  or  denomi- 
nation of  that  form  :  as,  triangle,  quadrangle,  rational  animal, 
or  man,  and  thus  in  an  easy  manner  it  is  specifically  desig- 
nated, of  what  quality  it  is,  namely  the  genus  is  designated 
and  on  the  other  hand,  the  specific  difference. 


'.\  * 


f,  I 


ATTRIBUTE. 


33 


CHAPTER    X. 


ATTEIBUTE. 

If  anything  is  determined  by  means  of  essentials,  that 
must  constantly  be  in  the  ens.     Those  things  which  are  de- 
termined by  means  of  essentials  are  called  attributes,     it 
anything  be  determined  by  means  of  all  the  essentials  taken 
tocrether  it  is  called  a  proper  attribute,  but  if  only  by  some 
of^them,  it  is  called  a  common  attribute.     Thus  the  three 
sides  of  the  triangle  are  the  essentials  of  an  equilateral  tri- 
angle ;  the  number  three  of  the  angles  is  a  common  attribute ; 
the  three  angles  equal  among  themselves  is  a  proper  attri- 
bute     Whatever  is  in  an  ens,  has  a  place  either  among  its 
essentials,  or  its  attributes,  or  its  modes.     Attributes  are  con- 
stantly in  an  ens  ;  modes  may  be,  or  may  not  be  m  it.    ihose 
things  which  are  constantly  in  an  ens,  and  are  not  determined 
by  means  of  other  things,  which  are  in  it  at  the  same  time, 
are  to  be  ranked  in  the  number  of  essentials.     But  those 
thino-s  which  are  constantly  in  an  ens,  and  are  determined  by 
means  of  other  things,  which  are  in  it  at  the  same  time,  are 
attributes.     For  if  we  embrace  in  our  idea  all  the  things 
which  are  in  an  ens,  we  discern  in  that  idea  that  some  things 
are  determined  by  others,  which  are  in  the  ens  at  the  same 
time ;  and  in  enumerating  what  those  things  are,  which  serve  to 
determine  the  rest,  we  understand  that  certain  things  which 
are  in  the  ens  must  be  put  in  the  first  place.     These  are  not 
mutually  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and  nevertheless  are 
not  determined  by  other  things  which  are  in  tlie  ens  at  the 
same  time.   Why  attributes  are  present,  a  sufficient  reason  is 
contained  in  the  essentials.      Why  common  attributes  are 
present,  a  sufficient  reason  is  contained  in  some  of  the  essen- 
tials •  why  proi)er  attributes  are  present,  a  sufficient  reason  is 
contained  in  all  the  essentials.     Those  things,  which  are  ol 
the  same  species,  have  the  same  attributes  and  proximate 
possibilities  of  the  same  modes,  likewise  also  what  are  called 
remote  conditional  possibilities.     Things  which  are  of  the 


* 


1 1. 


84 


ONTOLOGY. 


same  genus  have  the  same  common  attributes,  and  possibili- 
ties of  the  same  modes,  which  are  like  common  attributes. 
Things  which  have  the  same  proper  attributes  and  possibili- 
ties of  the  same  modes,  which  are  like  common  attributes, 
are  of  the  same  species.  Things  which  have  the  same  com- 
mon attributes,  or  possibilities  of  the  same  modes,  which  are 
like  common  attributes,  are  referred  to  some  same  genus.^ 
Essences  of  things  are  absolutely  necessary;  attributes  of 
things  are  absolutely  necessary.  The  proximate  possibility 
of  mode  is  absolutely  necessary.  Attributes  of  tilings  and 
proximate  possibiUties  of  modes  are  attributes  and  modes 
unchangeable  in  themselves.  Quantity  being  excluded,  they 
are  qualities ;  and  they  are  also  accidents.  Attributes  are 
not  modifiable,  but  unchangeable,  and  incapable  of  other 
determinations  successively;  therefore  they  are  accidents. 
The  possibility  of  modes,  whose  reason  is  contained  in  essen- 
tials, must  be  included  among  attributes ;  for  example,  the 
divisibility  of  a  parallelogram  by  its  diagonal  into  two  equal 
parts  is  determined  by  the  parallelism  of  its  sides  and  by 
their  number,  and  so  it  is  an  attribute  of  the  parallelogram. 

Wolf. 

Words  predicable  and  attributive  are/v^.  1.  Genus,  the 
supreme  and  most  general,  always  genus,  even  when  sub- 
altern, which  last  in  a  certain  respect  is  genus  or  species. 
2.  Species,  the  lowest  and  most  special,  always  species,  and 
attributed  immediately  to  individuals,  even  when  subaltern, 
which  last  in  a  certain  respect  is  genus  and  species.  3. 
Difference,  either  essential,  constituting  a  part  of  the  defini- 
tion or  essence  of  the  thing,  or  accidental,  which  does  not 
regard  the  essence  of  the  thing.  4.  Property,  which  is  ap- 
plicable, either  generally  to  a  whole  subject  and  not  to  it 
alone ;  or  to  one  subject  only,  and  not  generally  and  entirely 
to  this ;  or  entirely  to  one  subject  and  to  it  alone,  but  not 
always;  or  entirely  to  one  subject,  and  to  it  alone  and 
always.  5.  Accident,  common  and  separable  from  its  effec- 
tive subject;  or  inseparable  from  its  subject,  unless  by 
means  of  perception.  Dupleix. 

Besides  the  essentials  in  any  given  ens,  more  things  are 
required.     Essentials  alone  do  not  constitute  an  ens,  that  it 


ATTRIBUTE. 


35 


M 


be  such  as  it  is.  That  it  is  a  form,  it  derives  from  its  essen- 
tials ;  that  it  is  such  a  form,  from  its  determinations ;  that 
it  can  be  such,  both  from  its  essentials  and  its  attributes. 
That  it  can  be  what  it  is,  is  an  attribute.  That  essence  is 
in  anything  is  an  attribute,  and  thence  an  accident. 

The  essentials  of  a  muscle  are  its  motor  fibres :  its  at- 
tributes are  that  the  motor  fibres  are  connected  by  their 
own  bands,  that  they  are  surrounded  by  a  common  mem- 
brane, and  that  they  are  thus  fitted  for  producing  a  cer- 
tain action.  It  is  an  attribute,  so  far  as  the  muscle  is  de- 
termined to  a  special  action,  that  it  consists  of  a  tendon, 
and  that  it  is  fastened  to  a  small  bone,  or  to  a  movable 
and  an  immovable  part.  The  common  membrane  itself, 
the  tendons,  and  the  rest,  have  their  own  essentials,  but  they 
nevertheless  are  attributes  of  the  other.  The  essentials  of 
the  eye  are  its  fibres,  its  vessels,  its  humors ;  its  attributes 
are  the  possibilities  of  its  modes,  of  receiving  phenomena  by 
sight— -and  so  likewise  its  very  form  and  the  things  acces- 
sory to  its  essentials. 

An  attribute  of  the  angular  form  is  that  it  is  hard,  heavy, 
angular.  This  attribute  reigns  universally  in  all  species 
and  individuals.  Its  essentials  are  the  elements,  from  which 
come  its  essential  determinations,  namely,  that  they  are  con- 
tinually opposite  and  repugnant,  thus  contrary  to  each  other, 
whence  comes  gravity. 

The  attributes  of  the  circular  form  are  that  it  can  be  ex- 
panded and  contracted ;  that  all  its  diameters  meet  in  the 
centre ;  that  mobility  is  confined  to  its  periphery,  outside  of 
its  centre ;  thus  motion  and  rest  at  the  same  time  in  one 
body,  or  liberty  and  co-action ;  that  it  can  be  revolved  about 
an  axis  ;  can  resist  and  yield  ;  can  undergo  changes  of  state  ; 
that  it  can  be  the  measure  of  angular  forms,  and  can  give  the 
sines  of  all  angles  whatsoever. 

We  cannot  know  what  any  form,  body,  or  subject,  is, 


\ 


"T 


n 


36 


ONTOLOGY. 


unless  we  know  its  attributes.  Thus  we  must  know  the 
attributes  of  the  circular  form ;  that  it  can  be  contracted  and 
expanded;  can  yield  and  resist;  can  be  turned  about  an 
axis ;  and  at  the  same  time  that  the  direction  of  its  revo- 
lutions may  be  reversed ;  that  it  refers  every  motion  to  the 
centre,  and  that  all  rest  is  lost  at  the  periphery ;  that  it 
measures  every  triangular  form ;  that  it  has  a  certain  per- 
petual regard  to  the  angular,  and  yet  has  no  angle,  no  plane, 
no  opposite  direction,  except  in  one  place,  or  in  the  centre, 
where  direction  is  absolute.  These  by  some  are  called  pre- 
dicates, because  they  are  determined  by  essentials,  but  they  are 
proper  attributes,  and  like  proper  attributes,  common  at- 
tributes are  to  be  distinguished  from  them. 

That  is  a  proper  attribute,  which  can  be  attributed  to  that 
ens,  and  not  to  another.  That  is  a  common  attribute  which 
can  be  attributed  to  things  superior,  and  reigns  everywhere. 


CHAPTER    XL 


PREDICATE. 


Predicates  are  absolute  which  are  attributed  to  their 
subject  absolutely  without  any  condition  added.  Predicates 
become  hypothetical  under  a  given  condition ;  they  are  not 
supposed  as  possible,  unless  in  potency. 

Whatsoever  is  within  an  ens,  and  whatsoever  can  be  in  it, 
that  can  be  predicated  concerning  the  ens,  and  is  called  a 
predicate.  Thus  it  is  a  universal  word,  and  general  term 
for  all  essentials,  attributes,  accidents,  and  modes. 

From  predicates  which  agree,  and  which  do  not  agree  or 
are  inconsistent,  every  ens  may  be  known,  what  it  is,  and 
of  what  quality  it  is ;  for  an  ens  is  described  by  mere  pred- 
icates.    They  are  so  many  characters  and  indications  of  the 


)\ 


f  i# 


SUBJECT.— A  FFECTION. 


37 


ens.  Predicates  also  are  set  forth  by  means  of  types  and 
representations,  so  that  when  all  the  essence  and  nature  can- 
not be  described,  this  may  be  done  by  means  of  similitudes. 


CHAPTEE    XII. 


SUBJECT. 


That  is  called  a  subject  in  which  all  these  predicates  and 
adjuncts  reside.  Every  substance  is  a  determined  subject. 
It  is  that,  concerning  which  something  is  predicated ;  and 
that  which  is  described  and  defined  is  a  subject. 


CHAPTEE   XIII. 

affection. 

Wolf  says  that  under  affection  are  comprehended  both 
attributes  and  modes,  namely,  predicates  both  intrinsic  and 
extrinsic.  Hence  (he  says)  that  predications  are  the  same 
as  affections. 

But  every  affection  supposes  in  the  ens  an  active  and  a 
passive,  acting  and  reacting,  giving  and  receiving.  It  also 
supposes  a  form,  possibility  of  modes,  likewise  essentials  so 
determined,  as  well  as  mutabiHty  of  state.  Whether  this  be 
in  one  subject,  in  which  as  it  were  several  things  are  con- 
sidered, or  among  several  subjects,  in  order  that  there  may 
be  an  affection,  there  will  be  that  which  affects  and  that 
which  is  affected.  What  thence  results  is  called  an  affection. 
The  one  subject  is  not  always  affected  as  are  the  states  of  the 
affecting  subject,  but  something  intermediate  arises;  indeed, 


*^*.-- 


,^ 


t'» 


38 


ONTOLOGY, 


the  one  is  aflfected  in  a  contrary  manner ;  for  there  is  an  ap- 
plication of  the  modes  of  the  other,  which  causes  the  appro- 
priate affection  to  result  therefrom.  The  internal  sensory  is 
aflfected  by  the  eye  with  its  sight ;  but  the  aflfection  is  such  as 
is  the  internal  sensory  and  its  intermediate ;  yea,  also  the 
intellect  contributes  to  it ;  so  that  there  are  three  things 
which  are  aflfected.  Every  aflfection  proceeds  as  far  as  to 
the  first  substantial  in  all  bodies.  • 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

ACCIDENTS. 

That  which  is  not.  modifiable  is  an  accident.  Gravity  in 
a  stone  is  an  attribute.  Color  or  whiteness  in  a  stone  is  an 
accident.  Accidents  are  quantity,  magnitude,  figure,  situa- 
tion, space,  place,  time,  duration.  Attributes  and  modes  are 
accidents.  The  essence  of  a  compound  ens  consists  of  noth- 
ing but  mere  accidents.  Accidents  are  intrinsic  and  extrin- 
sic. Substance  is  not  an  accident,  but  accidents  cannot  exist 
without  substance.     Accidents  derogate  from  nothing. 

Therefore  accidents  are  all  those  things  which  are  not 
substances,  and  thus  not  subjects ;  for  accidents  belong  to 
substances.  Intrinsic  accidents  are  those  which  are  within 
substance,  so  far  as  that  means,  at  the  same  time,  a  subject 
in  which  form  is,  and  in  which  modes  obtain  ;  but  in  primal 
substance,  accidents  cannot  be  given,  because  from  it  they 
proeeed ;  otherwise  you  would  put  accidents  before  substance. 

Thus  substance  itself  is  the  subject  of  accident;  for  in 
compound  substance  nothing  is  given  except  accidents. 


I 


CONTINGENTS. 


39 


CHAPTER   XV. 


CONTINGENTS. 


A  CONTINGENT  is  that  which  may  be  or  may  not  be,  or, 
which  is  not  necessary :  as,  the  color  of  a  stone,  the  erudition 
of  a  man.  So  it  is  changeable,  and  has  not  a  suflScient  reason 
in  the  essence.  Contingents  have  no  necessary  existence,^ 
except  a  hypothetical  one.  A  contingent  ens  has  a  suflScient 
reason  outside  of  itself  in  another  ens.  There  is  such  a  thing 
as  a  series  of  contingents. 

Contingents  indeed  happen  from  a  cause  not  necessary, 
which  appears  necessary  to  us,  as  from  Providence.  Matters 
of  chance  all  appear  as  contingents,  while  they  flow  from 
necessary  causes  unknown  to  us;  as,  for  example,  the 
slaughter  of  the  infants  by  Herod.  And  again,  the  fashion- 
ing of  our  own  characters  has  a  necessary  cause  in  the  state  of 
the  soul.  Every  Divine  Providence  proceeds  by  means  of 
mere  contingents,  as  in  the  case  of  Joseph,  and  the  like ;  so 
that  nothing  may  appear  as  necessary,  although  it  be  neces- 
sary, in  this  supposed  state  of  things.  Nothing  is  given 
purely  necessary  in  physics,  but  it  becomes  necessary,  this  or 
that  being  given  or  supposed.  Thus  contingents  might  be 
said  to  be  the  causes  of  necessities,  and  necessities  the  causes 
of  contingents,  and  so  they  might  be  confounded.  Among 
contingents  might  be  placed  the  highest  necessity,  but  we 
do  not  so  regard  it. 


.  % 


1 


40 


oNTOLoar. 


%0 


CHAPTEK    XVI. 


MODES— MODIFICATION. 


Every  change  of  a  durable  thing  consists  in  variety  of 
modes.  Variation  and  succession  of  modes  is  modification. 
Ail  modes  are  variable.  Modes  and  determinations  are 
almost  the  same.  The  soul  is  modifiable,  because  it  can 
have  perceptions  of  other  things  and  desires  for  them.  A 
stone  is  modifiable  because  warm  or  cold,  dry  or  moist,  can 
be  added  to  it.  Every  mode  consists  in  limits  or  limitations. 
If  it  consists  in  only  one  limit,  it  is  simple. 

COLUMBIA  T^' 

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